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This volume seeks to explore the emergence of regulatory agencies in a range of developing countries across Asia, Africa,
and Latin America, focusing on telecommunications, electricity, and water. The authors hope that understanding the
regulatory state of the south, and particularly forms of accommodation to political pressures, could stimulate a broader
conversation around the role of the regulatory state in both north and south. This book will provide valuable theoretical and
empirical material to people working in economics, development, political science and law, writes Matt Birkinshaw. 
The Rise of the Regulatory State of the South: Infrastructure and Development in
Emerging Economies. Navroz K. Dubash and Bronwen Morgan (eds.). Oxford
University Press. July 2013.
Find this book: 
 
The Rise of the Regulatory State of the South , a new collection edited by Navroz K. Dubash and Bronwen Morgan, offers
plenty of rich empirical material and fresh ideas in rethinking economic regulation from a ‘southern’ perspective. It will be
particularly useful to readers in development, economics, law, comparative politics, or public administration.
Dubash, now Senior Fellow at Delhi’s Centre for Policy Research, may be familiar to those interested in south Asia, water, or
agrarian transition from his earlier book, Tubewell Capitalism. Morgan, also with a research interest in water, is currently
Professor of Law at the University of New South Wales . Contributors to the book come from a range of disciplines, particularly
political science and law, but also economy, planning, and sociology, and are well distributed geographically, with good
representation from the Americas and southern Asia.
How best to govern market power in society is a long-standing question. From the 1970s, in Europe and North America
approaches increasingly centred on sectoral regulation through agencies empowered to make technocratic decisions without
political interference – ‘the regulatory state’. During the 1990s governments across the developing world instituted this
template as a component of privatisation and liberalisation processes. However, ‘regulatory states’ in the South function in
quite different ways to their Northern templates. The book’s title references articles on ‘the rise of the regulatory state’ in
Europe, Britain and America but uses a ‘Southern’ perspective to highlight the importance of bringing politics into regulation
theory. The central claim is that the creation of apparently ‘independent’ regulatory authorities in ‘the South’ does not
necessarily result in decision-making free from political or social influence.
Tracing the divergent developments in electricity regulation across Indian states, Dubash’s own chapter in the book
foregrounds this argument about political influence. India’s power sector in the 1990s was in a state of crisis following
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struggles by political interests, particularly across classes of users (agriculture, industry, domestic), which had left it on very
weak financial footing. International donor agencies put strong pressure on adoption of regulation as a means of removing
decision making from the political arena. Examining the careers of these regulatory bodies in Andrah Pradesh, Delhi, and
Karnataka, Dubash argues firstly that regulatory institutions may not only fail to reduce political pressures on decision-making
but can increase it through new channels – or act as a ‘policy irritant’ by introducing unexpected effects. Dubash argues that
conflicts between regulatory independence and political constraints can lead to adjustments and workarounds, which
‘preserve the myth of regulatory autonomy and technocracy, even while allowing for the accommodation of political pressures’
(p.107).
The second main argument of The Rise of the Regulatory State  as a whole is that regulation can function not simply as a limit
on markets, but more positively in a developmental aspect to deliver improved socio-economic outcomes. While mechanistic
institutional transplants are insufficient to depoliticize regulation, the rationales given for decisions, and the form and locations
of negotiations over those decisions, do change. Dubash cites the introduction of new processes in regulatory design as
providing an increased range of accountability and participatory possibilities, and argues that we can see these as ‘embryonic
new sites for democratic politics around service delivery’, and a potentially conducive setting for ‘regulatory society’.
Urueña’s opening chapter on global water governance and the ‘constitutional regulatory state’ in Colombia illustrates this
more positive model of ‘extended’ regulation. In contrast to received understandings, Urueña’s case highlights a blurring of
regulation and redistribution through an active role of the courts. Water regulation in Colombia was informed as much by
constitutional and human-rights-based legal advocacy as by economic arguments for efficient markets. The coming together
of these two movements established a space for negotiation that Urueña calls a ‘constitutional regulatory state’.
In their conclusion, Dubash and Morgan suggest that regulatory states should be understood as shaped by contextual factors
and positioned on a continuum between ‘rules’ and ‘deals’. Since regulatory bodies are invariably subject to political
pressures, we can more helpfully view their role as ‘facilitating legitimate forms of negotiation, rather than as neutral
rulemakers, monitors and enforcers’ (pp. 281-2). Dubash and Morgan suggest that regulatory institutions could develop their
tendency for to act as democratic spaces with greater focus on structured negotiation, the role of judiciary and civil society,
and facilitated access for the politically disadvantaged (pp. 294-5).
One of the things I particularly like about The Rise of the Regulatory State of the South  is its division into two sections: case
studies and commentaries. The first section maintains a strong empirical focus to examine regulation reform in infrastructure,
particularly water, electricity and telecoms in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, India and the Philippines. The second
commentaries section (including chapters by Jordana and Levi-Faur) both offers the reader a range of readings and
interpretations and makes connections to more general arguments.
This is not always an easy book to read, but it is rewarding. The prose is clear but the content is sometimes complex and at
quite a high level of abstraction or dense with descriptive detail. A strength of the book is that the chapters, cases and
commentaries, cover a range of perspectives and do not necessarily present a single point of view. This book will provide
valuable theoretical and empirical material to people working in economics, development, political science and law. For LSE
library members, the e-book is available. Some of the papers the book is based on are also available in a special issue of
Regulation and Governance.
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